

INTERPRETABLE, ROBUST, RISK-AWARE FRAMEWORK FOR LEARNING SEPSIS TREATMENT STRATEGIES

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PROF. DESSISLAVA PACHAMANOVA, BABSON COLLEGE



SEPSIS IS THE THIRD LEADING CAUSE OF DEATH IN THE U.S.



Sepsis is a **dysregulated** response to **infection**.

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Can lead to organ failure, permanent disability

Responsible for **250K deaths** per year in US and **largest portion of hospitalization costs**

TREATING SEPSIS IS A DIFFICULT DECISION-MAKING PROBLEM

- Sepsis is a broad, **heterogeneous** condition
- Each hour treatment is delayed **reduces survival chances** by 7.6%¹

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Hour 0

- Antibiotics started
- SOFA score + 2 in 48 hr
- Blood culture ordered
- ...


Sepsis diagnosed



¹Arulappen et al. (2022)

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
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
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
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RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND CHALLENGES


Questions

- What **volume of IV fluids** and vasopressors to give to patients at each stage based on **which characteristics**?
- How to **allocate scarce resources** (ventilators and dialysis machines) for sepsis patients?

Challenges

- No data-driven, **patient-specific recommendations** for sepsis treatment
- Fixed batch of **observational data** (experimentation not feasible)
- Recommendations need to be **safe** and **explainable** to be implementable

DATA: OBSERVED PATIENT TRAJECTORIES



- 21K sepsis patients + final outcomes (end status at hospital)
- 1.7M rows of data
- Imputed missing values, engineered additional features

MDP MODEL OF SEPSIS TREATMENT

State Space X:

vital signs, hour,
lab values,
engineered
features, past
treatments

- 1
- 2
- 3
- 4

time →

MDP MODEL OF SEPSIS TREATMENT

State Space X:

vital signs, hour,
lab values,
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treatments

1

Action Space A:

0-10 mL IV fluid

2

...

2 low dose VP

3

1 high dose VP

high flow O₂


4

dialysis


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
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MDP MODEL OF SEPSIS TREATMENT



1. Learn states and transition probabilities from a fixed batch of data
2. Solve for the best action for each state (depends on transition probabilities)

CONSTRUCTING STATES TO GET A CONCISE MDP

High level idea: **Iteratively split** feature space X into regions of points (states) S that have **similar rewards** and **respond similarly** when given the same treatments

$$\phi: X \rightarrow S$$

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
$$\phi: X \rightarrow S$$

systolic
blood
pressure

heart rate


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
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
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
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
$\hat{r}(s)$ = average reward of data points that fall into s

$$\hat{r}(s) = \frac{\sum_{x \in S} r(x)}{n_s}$$

$\hat{p}(s'|s, a)$ = proportion of points in s taking action a that transition to s'

$$\hat{p}(s'|s, a) = \frac{n_{sas'}}{n_{sa}}$$

INTERPRETING THE FEATURES-TO-STATE MAPPING $\phi: X \rightarrow S$



SOLVE LEARNED MDP TO OBTAIN POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

We now have the states and transition probabilities of the MDP.

Traditionally, “**best actions**” are chosen based on expected value / **average** performance.

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Since the actions are treatments for critically ill patients, we want:

1. Risk-averse (to bad outcomes) policies
2. Robust (to estimation error) policies
3. Expert-guided decisions

RISK-AVERSE VALUE ITERATION

Traditionally, MDPs are solved for policies that maximize expected (long term) value

Value iteration: $\mathcal{T}V(s) = \max_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \{r(s) + \mathbb{E}_{s'}[\gamma V(s')]\} = \max_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \{r(s) + \gamma \sum_{s'} p(s'|s, a) V(s')\}$

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When making patient treatment decisions, need to consider **worst-case outcomes**

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
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When making patient treatment decisions, need to consider **worst-case outcomes**

Conditional Value at Risk (CVaR): $CVaR^{(q)}(Z) = \mathbb{E}[Z | Z \leq VaR^{(q)}(Z)]$

where $VaR^{(q)}(Z)$ is the q^{th} quantile of random variable Z



RISK-AVERSE VALUE ITERATION


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
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CVaR value iteration: $\mathcal{T}^{(q)}V(s) = \max_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \{r(s) + \gamma CVaR_{s'}^{(q)}[V(s')]\}$
 $= \max_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \{r(s) + \gamma \sum_{s': V(s') < VaR_{s'}^{(q)}[V(s')]} \frac{1}{q} p(s'|s, a) V(s')\}$

SIMULATED LONG-TERM VALUES UNDER POLICIES


We simulate the cumulative rewards obtained from following **CVaR value iteration policy** and **traditional value iteration policy** on sepsis dataset



CVAR VALUE ITERATION IS ROBUST TO ESTIMATION ERROR

Iterated CVaR MDP (solved with CVaR value iteration)


$$\max_{\pi} ICVaR_{\hat{p}}^{(q)}(s) \text{ is equivalent to}^1$$



Robust MDP (with a particular uncertainty set)

$$\max_{\pi} \min_{p \in U_p} V_p^{\pi}(s)$$


$$U_p = \{ \otimes_{s,a} p(\cdot|sa) | \forall (s,a) \in \mathcal{S} \times \mathcal{A} : 0 \leq p(s'|s,a) \leq \frac{1}{q} \hat{p}(s'|s,a) \forall s' \in \mathcal{S}, \sum_{s' \in \mathcal{S}} p(s'|s,a) = 1 \}$$



i.e. we get robustness for free when we use CVaR value iteration!

PERFORMANCE ON WORST-CASE MIS-ESTIMATION

We evaluated the both **robust optimal policy** and **traditional optimal policy** on the **worst-case realization of $\mathbf{p} \in U_p$**



PILOTING RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SEPSIS TREATMENT


I. Co-design user interface of the recommendation tool

Characteristics defining patient's current state

- SOFA score < 5.5
- SOFA score > 2.5
- Not on antibiotics
- Time in ICU < 21.5 hours
- Glasgow Coma Score < 14
- Temperature > 102.5

state I

Values of actions for patient's current state



Probabilities of reaching each end state from action*




*only holds if optimal policy is followed thereafter

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
2. In simulations, have clinicians provide feedback on recommendations

Patient characteristics



- BP 83/50
- Lactate 4.5
- Heart rate 120
- Oxygen sat 87%
- Creatinine 2.5
- Urine output 0 ...



Clinician inputs
their decision



Clinician is shown
recommendation



Agree or
disagree?
Why?

PILOTING RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SEPSIS TREATMENT

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
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
3. While treating live patients, show clinicians the recommendations



Clinician inputs
their decision




Clinician is shown
recommendation



Take or not?
Why?

PATIENTS ARE LINKED BY SHARED RESOURCE CAPACITY

- Assumption so far: each patient's treatment is **independent** of each other
- In reality, patients in a hospital are linked by a **common pool of resources**
- To account for this, model all patients together as a system



RESOURCE CAPACITY-AWARE MDP

- We can model all patients together as a weakly coupled MDP, $\mathbf{M} = (\mathbf{S}, \mathbf{A}, \mathbf{P}, \mathbf{R})$ where
 - $\mathbf{S} = \times_i S_i$ 
 - $\mathbf{A}(\mathbf{s}) = \{\mathbf{a} \in \times_i A_i: \sum_i \mathbf{D}_i(s_i, a_i) \leq \mathbf{b}\}$, where $\mathbf{D}_i(s_i, a_i)$ is the number of resources used by that state-action combination s_i, a_i 
 - $\mathbf{P}(\mathbf{s}'|\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{a}) = \prod_i p_i(s'_i|s_i, a_i)$
 - $\mathbf{R}(\mathbf{s}) = \sum_i r_i(s_i)$
- This weakly coupled MDP has an exponentially large state and action space, which makes it intractable to solve for more than a few patients
- Solve Lagrangian relaxation!



ALLOCATING LIMITED RESOURCES IN REAL TIME

x_{sj} = number of patients in state s to assign to resource combination j at the current time

$v_{sj} = \max_{a \in A(j)} \{Q^*(s, a)\}$ where $A(j)$ is the set of actions that use resource combination j

$$\max_x \sum_{s \in \mathcal{S}} \sum_{j \in \mathcal{J}} v_{sj} x_{sj}$$

$$\text{s.t.} \sum_{s \in \mathcal{S}} \sum_{j \in \mathcal{J}} c_{rj} x_{sj} \leq u_r \quad \forall r \in \mathcal{R}$$

$$\sum_{j \in \mathcal{J}} x_{sj} = n_s \quad \forall s \in \mathcal{S}$$

$$x_{sj} \in \mathbb{Z}^+ \quad \forall s \in \mathcal{S}, j \in \mathcal{J}$$

Maximize total long term value

subject to


Resources used does not exceed resources available

Every patient is assigned to one resource combination

$\mathcal{R} = \{\text{ventilator, dialysis machine}\}$

$\mathcal{J} = \{\text{ventilator and dialysis, ventilator only, dialysis only, no ventilator or dialysis}\}$

SIMULATED DISCHARGES UNDER VARYING RESOURCE LEVELS



CONCLUSIONS

- Learned the dynamics of **sepsis patient treatment** using an observational dataset by designing a **concise, interpretable MDP model**
- Proposed **risk-aware, robust, capacity-aware MDP solution methods** for obtaining recommended sepsis treatment policies
- Provided a **flow chart** for classifying sepsis patients and **user interface** for recommending treatments
- Designed **ongoing pilot** of decision-support tool
- Formulated tractable optimization for **real-time resource allocation** for sepsis treatment
- Illustrated benefits of recommendations using **simulations** on real patient data

Dynamic Optimization of Workforce Talent

Parshan Pakiman
(University at Buffalo – SUNY)



Dan Adelman (U Chicago)



Adam Mersereau (UNC)

- Our work is motivated by the daily challenges faced by UChicago Medicine’s operating room manager in assigning operating rooms.
- Familiarity is a key operational factor in designing effective assignments.
- Empirical evidence suggests that greater familiarity improves patient outcomes and costs (Avgerinos & Gokpinar, 2017; Chen, 2021; Witmer et al., 2023; Tuzcuoglu et al., 2024).



Broader labor-management concept: workers gain familiarity with jobs by performing them repeatedly, which can lead to improved performance (Wright 1936, Argote and Epple 1990)

- **Service** (Gans and Zhou 2003, Chen et al. 2017, Bavafa and Jónasson 202, ...)
- **Manufacturing** (Huckman et al. 2009, Huckman and Staats 2011, ...)

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Existing Work

Modeling the Right Notion of Familiarity from Data



Our Work

Dynamically Optimizing Familiarity Levels




A New Dynamic Assignment Problem


We study a dynamic assignment problem of “jobs” to “workers” under **familiarity** and **availability** dynamics

A New Dynamic Assignment Problem

Familiarity dynamics:




Familiarity dynamics:




A New Dynamic Assignment Problem

Availability dynamics:



Availability dynamics:



Management trade-off: How should a manager balance the benefits of maintaining specialized workers versus reaping the benefits of cross-functional workers?

- **Exogenous state:** job and worker availability vectors x
- **Endogenous state:** job-worker familiarity matrix F

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- **Action:** job-worker assignment matrix A
- **Action space:** availability-dependent feasibility constraints $\mathcal{A}(x)$

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- **Action:** job-worker assignment matrix A
- **Action space:** availability-dependent feasibility constraints $\mathcal{A}(x)$
- **Cost function:** linear cost function $c(F, A)$
- **Assignment policy:** $\pi : \mathcal{X} \times \mathcal{F} \mapsto \mathcal{A}(x)$

$$\min_{\pi: \mathcal{X} \times \mathcal{F} \mapsto \mathcal{A}(x)} \text{Cost}(\pi) := \mathbb{E}^{\pi} \left[\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \alpha^t c(F^{t,\pi}, A^{\pi}(x^t, F^{t,\pi})) \right]$$

- **Exogenous state:** job and worker availability vectors x
- **Endogenous state:** job-worker familiarity matrix F
- **Action:** job-worker assignment matrix A
- **Action space:** availability-dependent feasibility constraints $\mathcal{A}(x)$
- **Cost function:** linear cost function $c(F, A)$
- **Assignment policy:** $\pi : \mathcal{X} \times \mathcal{F} \mapsto \mathcal{A}(x)$

Our MDP is quite general:

- Availability can evolve according to any exogenous Markov chain
- Learning rates can be heterogeneous across jobs and workers
- Action space can include other operational constraints

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Our MDP is particularly challenging to tackle:

- High-dimensional exogenous and endogenous states
- High-dimensional and state-dependent action space
- High-dimensional expectations

- **Exogenous state:** job and worker availability vectors x
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How does the MDP formulation enable studying the specialization vs cross-functionality trade-off?

- Limiting familiarity levels under policy π :

$$\bar{f}_{jk}^{\pi} := \mathbb{E}^{\pi} \left[\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} \mathbf{f}_{jk}^{t, \pi} \right]$$

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- An illustrative example

Policy 1

Job 1					0.9
Job 2			0.8		
Job 3		0.8			
	Worker 1	Worker 2	Worker 3	Worker 4	Worker 5

Policy 1 favors specialization

- Limiting familiarity levels under policy π :

$$\bar{f}_{jk}^{\pi} := \mathbb{E}^{\pi} \left[\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} f_{jk}^{t, \pi} \right]$$

- An illustrative example

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Job 1					0.9
Job 2			0.8		
Job 3		0.8			
	Worker 1	Worker 2	Worker 3	Worker 4	Worker 5

Policy 1 favors specialization

Policy 2

		0.3			0.3
		0.2	0.3		0.3
			0.2		
	Worker 1	Worker 2	Worker 3	Worker 4	Worker 5

Policy 2 favors cross-functionality

Designed Policy

- Familiarity agnostic (FA) policy
- Lagrangian relaxation (LR) policy

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Uncovered Insight

- FA policy → Favors building cross-functional workers
- LR policy → Favors building specialized workers

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Developed Performance Bound

- FA policy → Near-optimal if learning happens slowly
- LR policy → Near-optimal if availability minimally impacts assignment feasibility

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Developed Performance Bound

- FA policy → Near-optimal if learning happens slowly
- LR policy → Near-optimal if availability minimally impacts assignment feasibility

Developed Algorithm

- Math-programming-based method to compute both policies.

Dynamic Assignment / Matching

Caldentey et al. 2009, Bertsimas et al. 2013, Golrezaei et al. 2014, Gurvich and Ward 2015, Ma and Simchi-Levi 2020, Johari et al. 2021, Afèche et al. 2022, Aouad and Saritac 2022, Delong et al. 2024, Bansak et al. 2024, ...



Modeling Familiarity / Experience

Gans and Zhou 2003, Reagans et al. 2005, Avgerinos and Gokpinar 2017, Ramdas et al. 2018, Zhang et al. 2024, Tuzcuoglu et al. 2024, ...

- **Quasi-open-loop policies** (Adelman and Mancini 2016, Bai et al. 2023)
- **Inventory-agnostic policies** (Bai et al. 2022)
- **Fast-slow moving MDPs** (Wang and Jiang 2023)
- **Weakly-coupled MDPs** (Hawkins 2003, Adelman and Mersereau 2008, Brown and Smith 2020, Torrico and Toriello 2022, Nadarajah and Cire 2024, ...)
- **Math-programming-based ADP** (De Farias and Van Roy 2003, Desai et al. 2012, Zhang and Adelman 2009, Tong and Topaloglu 2013, Nadarajah et al. 2015, Pakiman et al. 2024, ...)

Construction

|

$$\pi : \mathcal{X} \times \mathcal{F} \mapsto \mathcal{A}(x)$$



$$\hat{\pi} : \mathcal{X} \mapsto \mathcal{A}(x)$$

Construction

$$\pi : \mathcal{X} \times \mathcal{F} \mapsto \mathcal{A}(x) \quad \longrightarrow \quad \hat{\pi} : \mathcal{X} \mapsto \mathcal{A}(x)$$

Insights (Proposition 1)

$\min_{\hat{\pi}} \text{Cost}(\hat{\pi}) \equiv$ Optimizing familiarity levels and assignment probabilities in the steady state

Enables the development of a cross-functional workforce

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Computation (Theorem 2)

$\min_{\hat{\pi}} \text{Cost}(\hat{\pi}) \equiv$ a stochastic quadratic program

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Performance Bound (Theorem 1)

FA policy is near-optimal if learning and forgetting happen slowly

Construction

$$\mathcal{A}(x) := \{A \in \{0, 1\}^{J \times K} \mid J + K \text{ combinatorial constraints}\} \quad \lambda = (\lambda^W, \lambda^J)$$

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Insights (Theorem 3)

$$\bar{\pi}_{jk}^\lambda(f_{jk}) = \begin{cases} \text{Assign} & \text{if } f_{jk} \geq 1 - \frac{(1-\alpha)(1-\ell_{jk})}{(1-\alpha)c_{jk}^1} \left[\lambda_k^K + \lambda_j^J + c_{jk}^1 - c_{jk}^0 \right] \\ \text{Not Assign} & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

The LR approach enables the development of specialized workers

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Computation (Theorem 3)

The LR policy can be obtained using binary programs.

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
Performance Bound (Proposition 3)

LR policy is near optimal if assignment feasibility constraints change minimally in x

- Total number of instances: 120
- Numbers of jobs and workers: $(J, K) \in \{(2, 5), (2, 8), (3, 5), (3, 6), (4, 5)\}$
- Worker-job availability: deterministic, low-uncertainty, high-uncertainty
- Learning rates: zero, half, one
- Proposed policies: FA, LR, and ALP policies

$$\text{Policy gap} = \% (\text{Cost of Policy} - \text{Cost of Best Proposed Policy}) / (\text{Cost of Best Proposed Policy})$$

Learning rate magnitude



Specialization vs Cross-Functionality

		FA policy				LR policy				ALP policy					
Small ℓ Large \hat{M}	Jobs	0.8	0.2			0.7			0.2	0.7			0.2		
			0.2	0.8			0.7		0.2		0.7		0.2		
		0.2			0.8			0.7	0.2			0.7	0.2		
Large ℓ Small \hat{M}	Jobs	0.8				0.2	0.5			0.5	0.4		0.2	0.2	
				0.8		0.2		0.6				0.4		0.3	
					0.8	0.2			0.6		0.3		0.3	0.3	
Large ℓ Large \hat{M}	Jobs		0.2			0.8	0.7			0.2	0.4			0.2	0.3
		0.2		0.8				0.6		0.3		0.4		0.2	
			0.2			0.8			0.6	0.3	0.3		0.3	0.2	
		Workers				Workers				Workers					

- **Low impact of availability:**
 - LR policy outperforms FA policy and is near-optimal
 - LR policy delivers strong portfolios of specialized workers

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- **Low impact of availability:**
 - LR policy outperforms FA policy and is near-optimal
 - LR policy delivers strong portfolios of specialized workers
- **High impact of availability & low learning/forgetting rates:**
 - FA policy outperforms LR policy and is near-optimal
 - FA policy delivers strong portfolios of cross-functional workers
- **Note:** We have developed an **approximate linear programming (ALP) policy** that performs well on instances with **high availability impact** and **high learning/forgetting rates**.

Our research enables the study of complex labor–management dynamics and provides a framework for dynamically optimizing talent across the workforce.

Q&A






Sequential diagnostic testing with patient refusal dynamics

A decision-making framework with correlation + mixed test outcomes + refusal dynamics

Shakiba Rahnama • Joint work with Negar Soheili & Ludwig Dierks


Information Decision Sciences — University of Illinois Chicago

Diagnosis is like “20 Questions” in a clinic



Symptoms

A patient comes to the clinic with symptoms that could match several diseases and they might even have more than one at the same time.




Diagnosis

The provider tries to identify the underlying disease based on the patient's symptoms.

Possible tests?

- ESR
- CRP
- Anti-CCP

Tests can be correlated



Patient can refuse doing the test

Goal: learn enough before the patient opts out

Why is sequential diagnosis hard in the real world?

Multiple diseases

- Multiple diseases can co-exist, so it's not "disease vs no disease," it's among many combinations.
- The number of possible disease patterns grows quickly (about 2^M for M diseases).

Correlated results

- Tests are correlated because a hidden patient factor (severity/inflammation) shifts many results together.
- Ignoring correlation overestimates certainty.

Patient Refusal

- Patients may refuse tests as the burden accumulates.
- The plan must anticipate dropout, not assume completion.

We need a sequential decision model that can update beliefs quickly, while handling **multi-disease uncertainty, correlated tests, and patient refusal**.

A gap in the literature

World A: OR / decision models

Model diagnosis testing as a sequential decision problem (MDP/POMDP): update beliefs after each test and decide “test vs stop”.

Steimle and Denton (2015), Alagoz et al. (2015), Zhang et al., (2022).

- Outcomes are simplified for tractability.
- Tests are assumed to be independent.
- Patient dropout is typically not modeled.

World B: diagnostic statistics


Study how to combine multiple tests (cutoffs, series/parallel rules) and evaluate the accuracy of a fixed pathway, often allowing dependence.

Leeflang et al. (2008), Fanshawe et al. (2024), and Böttcher & Felder (2025).

- Pathway is usually not optimized sequentially.
- Often assumes a single outcome type/scale.
- Refusal is typically not part of the decision.

We model sequential testing while accounting for patient dropout, correlated tests, and multiple diseases.

Dependence model: one latent physiology drives many tests



- We capture within-patient correlation using a single latent factor Z.
- Given the true disease pattern and Z, the remaining test noise is independent - dependence comes from unobserved Z.

Model: Sequential diagnosis as a POMDP

(S, A, O, T, C, γ) - decide “test vs stop” under partial information

States

D = disease pattern \rightarrow Un-observed
Z = latent factor \rightarrow Un-observed
 C_k = cumulative cost \rightarrow Observed

Belief

Belief $b_k(d)$ over disease patterns
 $Z \mid \text{History}: \mathcal{N}(\mu_k, \sigma_k^2)$

Observation

Patient: refuse with prob $P_{t_k}(C_k) \in [0,1]$
If accept \rightarrow result (binary or numeric)

Action

Offer a test t_k
Or stop and diagnose

Belief update and tractability

- Update disease-pattern weights $b_k(d)$ by **Bayes' rule** using disease pattern likelihood of observation

$\ell_{d,k}(x_k)$:

$$b_{k+1}(d) = \frac{b_k(d), \ell_{d,k}(x_k)}{\sum_{d'} b_k(d'), \ell_{d',k}(x_k)}$$

- Update a Gaussian summary for the latent correlation factor Z , i.e., $Z \approx \mathcal{N}(\mu_k, \sigma_k^2)$.

Issue

Correlation makes exact inference blow up: After a new observation, the true posterior couples \mathbf{D} and \mathbf{Z} , creating a mixture over all 2^M disease patterns.


Our fix

Step 1: Update Z within disease patterns that impact test outcomes:

- Numeric result: Z stays Gaussian (**Kalman-style** update)
- Binary result: Z is non-Gaussian \rightarrow approximate with a Gaussian (**Laplace**)

Step 2: Collapse the mixture **back to one** Gaussian

Match mean and variance to keep $Z \mid \text{History} \approx \mathcal{N}(\mu_k, \sigma_k^2)$.



Decision rule: stop now vs offer another test

Stop: misdiagnosis risk

- $c_i^-, c_i^+ > 0$: Cost of a false negative/false positive.

$$Q^{stop}(B_k) := \sum_{i=1}^M \min \left\{ \underbrace{p_{i,k} c_i^-}_{\text{Expected cost of FN}}, \underbrace{(1 - p_{i,k}) c_i^+}_{\text{Expected cost of FP}} \right\}$$

Where $p_{i,k} = \Pr(D_i = 1 | H_k)$ is the current probability that disease i is present, given all test results so far.

Test: expected cost-to-go

- $c_{t_k} \geq 0$: monetary cost of test t_k .

$$Q_k^{t_k}(B_k, C_k) = P_{t_k} \cdot Q^{stop}(B_k) + (1 - P_{t_k}) c_{t_k} \\ + (1 - P_{t_k}) \cdot (E [V_{k+1}(B_{k+1}, C_{k+1}) | B_k, a_k = t_k])$$

The expectation is over the predicted test outcome under belief $B_k = (b_k(d), (\mu_k, \sigma_k^2))$; if the test is accepted, the cumulative cost updates as $C_{k+1} = C_k + c_{t_k}$


$$V_k(B_k, C_k) = \min \{ Q^{stop}(B_k), \min_{t_k \in \mathcal{T}_k} Q_k^{t_k}(B_k, C_k) \},$$

Analytical insight from a baseline

Simple model: One disease, tests are binary (positive or negative), and independent

Goal: Finding the structure of optimal policy

$$\Delta(b, C) > 0 \Leftrightarrow Q^{stop}(b) - E[Q^{stop}(b^o)] > c_j + \frac{p_{t_k}}{1 - p_{t_k}} (bc^- - Q^{stop}(b))$$



Analytical insight from a baseline

$$Q^{stop}(b) - E[Q^{stop}(b^o)] > c_j + \frac{p_{t_k}}{1 - p_{t_k}} (bc^- - Q^{stop}(b))$$

Information gain = how much the test reduces expected misdiagnosis cost on average

Information gain

Effective Cost

The expected cost from being forced to stop early because of refusal

Expected cost of stopping after seeing the test result

Cost of stopping now

- When $p_j = 0$, then test iff information gain worth its price ($> c_j$)
- When $p_j > 0$, then test iff information gain worth its price and the risk of losing the chance to learn
- Testing region shrinks as refusal risk increases
- Some tests disappear entirely (even if informative)
- Information is front loaded: Test earlier, stop sooner

Thank you!

srahna3@uic.edu

Q&A

"EBAY" FOR HIGH-KDPI KIDNEYS: SIMULTANEOUS OFFERS TO DECREASE NONUSE

Meghan E. Meredith¹, Bonnie E. Lonze¹, Dorry L. Segev¹, Nicholas L. Wood², Allan B. Massie¹,
Sommer E. Gentry¹


*¹Department of Surgery, New York University Grossman School of Medicine, NYU Langone Health,
New York, NY, ²Hennepin Healthcare Research Institute, Minneapolis, MN*



DECEASED DONOR KIDNEY TRANSPLANTATION


Kidney transplantation is the gold standard treatment for end-stage kidney failure

- Kidneys eliminate toxins in blood and send waste out as urine
- Kidney failure can be caused by chronic conditions or acute injury, and leads to waste build up in the body
- There are two treatments for kidney failure:
 1. Dialysis: machine or fluid drip used to eliminate toxins
 2. Kidney transplant: surgical implantation of a donor kidney



Donor kidneys for transplantation are a scarce resource

In the United States in 2023,



National Institute of Diabetes and Digestive and Kidney Diseases, National Institutes of Health.

Lentine KL, Smith JM, Lyden GR, Miller JM, Booker SE, Dolan TG, Temple KR, Weiss S, Handarova D, Israni AK, Snyder JJ. OPTN/SRTR 2023 Annual Data Report: Kidney. Am J Transplant. 2025 Feb;25(2S1):S22-S137. doi: 10.1016/j.ajt.2025.01.020. PMID: 39947805; PMCID: PMC12414513.

Donor kidneys for transplantation are a scarce resource

In the United States in 2023,

4,000 people died on the waitlist

8,600 (28%) recovered deceased donor kidneys were not used

35,500,000 people with kidney disease

815,000 people with kidney failure


555,000 people on dialysis

142,000 people on the waiting list for a transplant
(including 47,000 people added in 2023)

28,000 kidney transplants performed

National Institute of Diabetes and Digestive and Kidney Diseases, National Institutes of Health.


Kidneys are often not used because they are not placed efficiently enough




The priority order is based on:

- donor-candidate compatibility
- candidate wait time
- geography
- expected survival benefit

Kidneys are often not used because they are not placed efficiently enough




Kidneys are often not used because they are not placed efficiently enough



Kidneys are often not used because they are not placed efficiently enough

- Kidneys are less likely to be accepted as they accumulate cold ischemia time
- Maybe candidate n declined the kidney but would have accepted if they received the offer sooner?



**AIM: PROPOSE AN ALLOCATION
POLICY TO EFFICIENTLY PLACE
HARD-TO-PLACE KIDNEYS TO
DECREASE NONUSE**

Aim: Design an allocation policy to more efficiently place hard-to-place kidneys to decrease nonuse

1. Hard-to-place: Kidneys with a high Kidney Donor Profile Index (KDPI) (> 75%)
 - KDPI is a numerical score (0-100%) characterizing a kidney's risk of transplant failure compared to other recovered kidneys
 - More than half of KDPI > 75% kidneys go unused
2. Alternative allocation policy for high-KDPI (hard-to-place) kidneys:
Simultaneous (rather than sequential) offers within geographic thresholds

Simultaneous offers for high-KDPI kidneys

High-KDPI deceased donor kidney recovered

Simultaneous Offers to all Centers within 250NM


Centers are given 1-2 hours to respond

At least one center accepts


All centers decline

Allocate to accepting candidate with highest priority

Simultaneous offers for high-KDPI kidneys



Simultaneous offers for high-KDPI kidneys



We test our proposed simultaneous offers policy with the Kidney-Pancreas Organ Allocation Simulator (OASim)

- Developed in 2024 by the Scientific Registry of Transplant Recipients (SRTR)
 - SRTR's mission: provide analysis to aid the DHHS in their oversight of the national organ transplantation system
- **Goal of OASim (2024):** simulate historic metrics of allocation policies (e.g., logistical burden of evaluating offers) AND organ utilization
 - Trained and tested on data from all recovered kidneys, regardless of utilization

Default logic of the Kidney-Pancreas Organ Allocation Simulator (OASim)

Utilization logic

- Assume that a kidney is not used if it is not accepted by the 1,000th offer

Accept/decline model

- Logistic regression to predict a candidate's likelihood of accepting a particular donor kidney
- **Features:** Donor characteristics, candidate characteristics, candidate-donor mismatch, geography, center-level, and allocation-related metrics

To represent our proposed simultaneous offers policy, we adjust the default OASim logic

Adjusted utilization logic

- Assume that a high-KDPI kidney is not used after being declined by all candidates at all centers

Adjusted accept/decline model

- Adjust allocation-related metrics to reflect that simultaneous offers do not have the same cold ischemia time accrued by time of offer or the information gained by previous candidates decline decisions

Accept/decline model allocation-related metric: Center number

A candidate's center number is the number of unique transplant centers (i.e., hospitals) to which the donor kidney had been previously offered, including their own center

Candidate	Priority Ordering	Center	Center Number
A	1	TNVU	1
B	2	PAPT	2
C	3	TNVU	2
D	4	NJBI	3
E	5	CTYN	4
F	6	MAMG	5
G	7	CTYN	5
H	8	NJBI	5

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H	8	NJBI	5

In the accept/decline logistic regression model:

- Center number coefficient: -0.10
- Center number odds ratio: 0.90

Interpretation: If a candidate's center number increases by 1, they have a 10% decrease in the odds of accepting the offer

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A candidate's center number is the number of unique transplant centers (i.e., hospitals) to which the donor kidney had been previously offered, including their own center

Candidate	Priority Ordering	Center	Center Number
A	1	TNVU	1
B	2	PAPT	2
C	3	TNVU	2
D	4	NJBI	3
E	5	CTYN	4
F	6	MAMG	5
G	7	CTYN	5
H	8	NJBI	5

In the accept/decline logistic regression model:

- Center number coefficient: -0.10
- Center number odds ratio: 0.90

Interpretation: If a candidate's center number increases by 1, they have a 10% decrease in the odds of accepting the offer

Center number represents a transplant candidate's location on the match run, which is a proxy for time since organ recovery and information gained by previous offer's declined

Adjustments to allocation-related metrics: Center number

Allocation-related metric	Value in accept/decline models			
	OASim default	Adjustment for simultaneous offers policy (values for accepting/declining KDPI > 75% kidney)		
		Candidates at centers ≤ 250NM	Candidates at centers 250-500NM	Candidates at centers > 500NM
Center number	# unique centers from previous offers	1	1 + Total # unique centers ≤ 250NM	1 + Total # unique centers ≤ 500NM

Adjustments to allocation-related metrics: Center number

Allocation-related metric	OASim default	Adjustment for simultaneous offers policy		
		Candidates at centers $\leq 250\text{NM}$	Candidates at centers 250-500NM	Candidates at centers $> 500\text{NM}$
Center number	# unique centers from previous offers	1	1 + Total # unique centers $\leq 250\text{NM}$	1 + Total # unique centers $\leq 500\text{NM}$

Example:

Default OASim					Adjusted for Simultaneous Offers				
Candidate	Priority Ordering	Distance	Center	Center Number	Candidate	Priority Ordering	Distance	Center	Center Number
A	1	600NM	TNVU	1	D	4	50NM	NJBI	1
B	2	300NM	PAPT	2	E	5	100NM	CTYN	1
C	3	600NM	TNVU	2	G	7	100NM	CTYN	1
D	4	50NM	NJBI	3	H	8	50NM	NJBI	1
E	5	100NM	CTYN	4	B	2	300NM	PAPT	3
F	6	400NM	MAMG	5	F	6	400NM	MAMG	3
G	7	100NM	CTYN	5	A	1	600NM	TNVU	5
H	8	50NM	NJBI	5	C	3	600NM	TNVU	5

OASim Data

- Four datasets of two-months between 2020-2023
- Each dataset contains:
 - ~90,000 transplant candidates
 - 3 samples of ~2,000 donors

We run 60 total simulations for both the existing allocation policy and our proposed simultaneous offers policy

RESULTS

Our proposed simultaneous offers policy decreases nonuse from 56.0% to 20.9% among high-KDPI kidneys

	Existing Policy	Simultaneous Offers Policy
Nonuse	percentage	
All kidneys	21.6%	12.5%
KDPI > 75% kidneys	56.0%	20.9%
KDPI ≤ 75% kidneys	9.7%	9.6%

Our proposed simultaneous offers policy increases the logistical burden of evaluating offers

	Existing Policy	Simultaneous Offers Policy
Logistical burden	mean	
# kidneys offered / center / mo	249.3	331.7
# KDPI > 75% kidneys offered / center / mo	136.7	207.6
# KDPI ≤ 75% kidneys offered / center / mo	128.8	128.81

CONCLUSION

Conclusions

- Deceased donor kidneys are a scarce and precious resource
- Thousands of kidneys are not used every year, while thousands of transplant candidates die on the waitlist
- Simultaneous offers for high-KDPI kidneys within geographic thresholds is a promising allocation policy that:
 - Reduces kidney nonuse from 21.6% to 12.5%
 - But increases the logistical burden of evaluating more kidney offers from 249.3 to 331.7 kidneys offered / center / month



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